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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellees Erwin M, Prince and Folkens Brothers Trucking
("Prince") do not dispute the Statement ol; Jin isdiction of
Appel I ant Cirant Dav i tison ( "Davidson") .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court's instruction to the jury m a t

a personal injury judgment is mil sub'jei"! tu federal income tax
constitutes any reversible error.

Standard of review:

de novo.

See, Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp,, 7 5 2 P 2d
884 (Utah 1988) (legal
2.

isMim

will be reviewed for correctness).

Whether the trial court's refusal to allow Davidson's

expert to give an opinion on the ultimate issue ol whether m
Prince was negligent const" i luted any reversible error.
of review:

clearly erroneous.

not

standard

see, State By and Through Utah

State Dept. of Social Services v. woods , 7 4 2 p , 2 d 118 f lit ah App,
1987) (decision, whether to admi t expert testimony lies within the
sound discretion of trial court and ruling will be sustained
unless clearly erroneous).
3.

Whether the tr i al court's admission of evidence of

factual statement contained in a demand letter constituted any
reversible error.

Standarc. ui review:

clear ] y ei r oneous.

Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P, 2d 204 (Utah App. 1988) (trial court's
rulings regarding admissibility .: evidence K;;: not be dif
unless it clearly appears tf

-:.:.;;.

See,

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is grounds for granting a new trial
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless
refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.

Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected. . . .

Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or
promising to furnish , or (2) accepting or offering or
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which
was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not
admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion
of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because
it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This rule also does not require
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution.

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Although Prince does not dispute Davidsonfs general
description of the course of the proceedings below, Davidson's
Statement of Facts is incomplete, and contains a number of
inaccuracies and irrelevancies.

Accordingly, pursuant to Rule

24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Prince submits
the following Statement of Facts:
1.

During trial in the court below, Davidson called an

expert accident reconstructionist to testify concerning certain
opinions held by the expert.

(Partial Trial Transcript ["PTT"]

at pp. 3-23.)
2.

Pursuant to questions by Davidson's counsel, the expert

presented his opinion to the jury as to, inter alia: (i) the
reason Prince's truck overturned while going around a curve; (ii)
whether the truck was travelling too fast for the curve; (iii)
what the speed of the truck was as it went through the curve;
(iv) what the speed limit was at the curve; (v) whether a person
hauling livestock should be concerned with his load and what the
concerns should be; and (vi) whether a person hauling livestock
could foresee the possibility of injury if the truck overturned.
(PTT at pp. 14-22. )
3.

After eliciting such opinions, and others, Davidson's

counsel asked whether the expert was also of the opinion that
Prince was "negligent in the operation of his motor vehicle at
the time this accident occurred".
-3-

When Prince's counsel

objected, the court did not allow the expert to testify as to the
ultimate issue of negligence.
4.

(PTT at p. 22.)

One of the theories presented to the jury by Prince's

counsel was that Davidson was contributorily negligent in causing
his own injuries because when Davidson saw the steer that had
been released from Princefs truck laying beside the railroad
tracks in an area bounded by a right-way fence, Davidson
approached too closely to the animal, causing the animal to
choose to get to its feet and chase him.

(Supplement Partial

Trial Transcript ("SPTT") at pp. 50-51.)
5.

During depositions and at trial, Davidson testified to

a number of different distances from which he first approached
the steer.

Davidson stated variously, for example, that the

distance was forty feet, thirty feet, twenty-five feet, twentytwo feet and twenty feet. (PTT at pp. 45-46.)
6.

Davidson had also written a demand letter to Prince's

insurer stating that the distance from which he had approached
the steer was actually ten feet.

The trial court allowed

Prince's counsel to refresh Davidson's recollection, or to
impeach Davidson's credibility, solely with the ten-foot
statement contained in the letter.
7.

(SPTT at pp. 47-48.)

Although the letter speaks for itself and is attached

in its entirety to Davidson's Brief, the Court should note that
it contains no concession or offer, nor expresses any willingness

-4-

whatsoever to compromise Davidsonfs claim.

(PTT at pp. 65-

67. ) x
8.

After the parties had rested, the trial court

instructed the jury as to damages.

The court informed the jury

that its duty was, inter alia, to determine the amount of damages
it found "from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and
adequately compensate the plaintiff for any injury and loss
plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the accident and any
injuries complained of by plaintiff."
9.

(R. 221.)

The court also instructed the jury it "was not

permitted to award speculative damages, by which term is meant
compensation for detriment which, although possible, is remote,
conjectural or speculative."

The court then stated in pertinent

part as follows:
In determining the amount of damages you may not
include in, or add to an otherwise just award, any sum
for the purpose of punishing the defendants, or to
serve as an example or warning for others. In
addition, you may not include in your award any sum for
court costs or attorneys fees. Neither may any sum of
money be added to that amount for federal income taxes.
I charge you as a matter of law that the amount awarded
by your verdict is exempt from federal income taxation.
(R. 225, 229.)
10.

After deliberations, the jury awarded Davidson total

damages in the amount of $45,539.80, and found Davidson forty

a

This is contrary to Davidson's Statement of Facts, which
characterizes the letter as a "settlement negotiation letter."
See, Davidson's Brief, at p. 4.
-5-

percent (40%) at fault for such damages.
sixty percent (60%) at fault.

The jury found Prince

(R. 242-244.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Where the jury in this personal injury action was

instructed that it was to award damages measured by full and
adequate compensation for any injuries caused by Prince's
negligence, and that it was not to speculate, an instruction
which correctly informed the jury that any judgment awarded was
not subject to federal income taxes did nothing to impair
Davidson's substantial rights.
2.

Simply because the rules allow expert testimony on

ultimate issues under certain circumstances, it does not follow
that the trial court's decision to exclude such testimony in this
case was improper where the trial court allowed ample testimony
from which the jury could infer such negligence.

Even if the

exclusion was improper, it in no way affected Davidson's
substantial rights where other evidence of negligence was before
the jury and the jury in fact found Prince negligent.
3.

The trial court's decision to allow Prince's counsel to

impeach Davidson's credibility with an admission of fact
contained in a demand letter in no way violates the rule
prohibiting evidence of compromise because the letter neither
expressed nor implied a willingness to compromise.

Even if it

had been a letter offering compromise, the evidence was not
-6-

offered to prove liability or validity of claim or its amount as
prohibited by the rule.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON
TAX CONSEQUENCES PROVIDES NO BASIS
FOR OVERTURNING THE JURY'S VERDICT.
In Utah, a jury's verdict will be overturned only where any
error committed in instructing the jury was so substantial and
prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result
would have been different in the absence of such error.

See

e.g., Matter of Estate of Kessler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985).

See

also, Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Thus the instruction as to the federal
tax consequences of any judgment does not require reversal unless
it can be concluded that the jurors have been confused to
Davidson's prejudice and/or mislead as to the law.

See, State v.

Ouzouian, 491 P.2d 1093, 1095-96 (Utah 1971) (no basis to support
contention that instruction to which appellants excepted affected
substantial rights so as to require reversal).
Courts addressing the question of whether a jury's verdict
in a personal injury case must be reversed if the jury is
instructed that its damage award is not subject to federal income
taxes have held that while it would not be error for the trial
judge to refuse to give such an instruction, such an instruction
would nevertheless not justify reversal if given.
-7-

For example,

in Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 117 (6th
Cir. 1974), the court stated:
Notwithstanding our previous holdings that the refusal
to give such a charge is not error, we are persuaded
that neither is it reversible error in a personal
injury actions involving awards exempt from federal
taxation for the trial judge in the sound exercise of
his discretion to advise the jury affirmatively that
its award will not be liable to federal income tax.
502 F.2d at 1123.

See also, Wickizer v. Medley, 348 N.E.2d 96

(Ind. App. 1976); and Nichols v. Marshall, 486 F.2d 791 (10th
Cir. 1973).

This rule is justified primarily because in a

personal injury case like this one, the instruction does not
require the jury to make complicated calculations, nor does it
necessitate speculation.
statement of the tax law.

It merely gives the jurors an accurate
Id.

The cases Davidson cites in his brief are not to the
contrary, but simply state the general rule that it is not error
to refuse to give such an instruction.
pp. 4-8.

See, Davidson's Brief, at

With one exception the cases Davidson cites simply do

not reach the issue presented here, whether, once an instruction
is given, it is so prejudicial as to require overturning the
jury's verdict.

C£., Barnett v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981)

(instruction not given, no error in refusing); Paducah Area
Public Library v. Terrick, 655 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. App. 1983)
(instruction not given, no error in refusing); Vehn v. Prouty,
321 N.W.2d 534, 538-39 (S.D. 1982) (instruction not given, no
error in refusing); Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734

F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) (instruction not given, no error in
refusing); Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 383 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. App.
1985) (instruction not given, no error in refusing); Ravera v.
Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 474 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. 1984)
(instruction not given, no error in refusing); Anderson v.
Teamsters Local 116 BLDG. Club, 347 N.W.2d 309 (N.D. 1984)
(instruction not given, no error in refusing); Hall v. County of
New Madrid, 645 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. App. 1982) (instruction not
given, no error refusing); Young v. Environmental Air Products,
Inc., 665 P.2d 88 (Ariz. App. 1982) (instruction not given, no
error refusing).2
In the instant case, the jury was instructed that if
Davidson was entitled to recover it should award damages that
would "fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for any
injury and loss plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the
accident and injuries complained of by plaintiff."

The jury was

instructed that it was not permitted to award "speculative
damages, by which term is meant compensation for detriment which,
although possible, [was] remote, conjectural or speculative."
Davidson does not contend that he was entitled to additional
2

The only case Davidson cites which addresses the issue of
whether an income tax instruction is so prejudicial as to require
reversal is Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843, 845 (N.C. App.
1982). Scallon, however, was not a personal injury action like
this case, but was a wrongful death action, and the court
specifically limited its holding to actions for wrongful death:
"[The tax instruction] would unduly complicate a wrongful death
action, which is already complicated by our statute . . . ."

-9-

damages based upon any mistaken belief that a portion of the
verdict would be used to pay taxes.
Thus the charge correctly reflected that Davidson was
entitled to recover fair compensation for any injuries and losses
caused by Prince's negligence.

The instructions given, read

together, merely served to caution the jury to base its award on
the evidence, not on speculation as to tax consequence, and it
nowhere appears how the instructions given in this case adversely
affected Davidson's substantial rights. Under the circumstances,
any error in giving the instruction that a damage award was not
subject to federal income taxes did not nothing to require
reversal of the jury's verdict.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION TO
EXCLUDE DAVIDSON'S EXPERT OPINION
ONLY AS TO THE ULTIMATE ISSUE OF
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE.
Davidson correctly points out that the rules allow expert
testimony in the form of an opinion that embraces an ultimate
issue.

See, Appellees' Brief, pp. 8-9.

Davidson is mistaken,

however, in assuming that simply because such testimony is
possible, the trial court committed any error in not allowing
such testimony in the instant case.
This is so primarily because the trial court did allow
Davidson's expert to give his opinion as to, inter alia: (i) the
-10-

reason Prince's truck overturned while going around a curve; (ii)
whether the truck was travelling too fast for the curve; (iii)
what the speed of the truck was as it went through the curve;
(iv) what the speed limit was at the curve; (v) whether a person
hauling livestock should be concerned with his load and what the
concerns should be; and (vi) whether a person hauling livestock
could foresee the possibility of injury if the truck overturned.
Contrary to the conclusory statement in Davidson's brief, none of
these opinions were expressed to the jury in wholly technical
terms or were impossible or even difficult for a lay jury to
understand.
Under such circumstances, the expert's opinion on the
ultimate issue of defendants' negligence was merely cumulative,
and may easily have been so cumulative as to be more prejudicial
than probative.

The trial court correctly exercised its

discretion in disallowing the opinion because such testimony was
unnecessary.
Just as importantly, even if it were error not to allow the
opinion in the conclusory terms sought by Davidson's counsel, it
nowhere appears how Davidson was harmed by the error.

"Error may

not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected.
Utah R. Evid. 103.

..."

Where there was substantial other evidence

presented by the expert from which the jury could infer that
Prince was negligent, and where the jury in fact did find Prince
-11-

negligent, there is no basis to overturn the juryfs verdict
simply because the expert could also have opined as to an
ultimate issue.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED NO
EVIDENCE OF STATEMENTS MADE IN
COMPROMISE NEGOTIATIONS, AND EVEN
IF IT HAD, SUCH STATEMENTS WERE
EXPRESSLY ADMISSIBLE FOR PURPOSES
RELATING TO CREDIBILITY.
As Davidson points out, rule 408 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence excludes evidence of "(1) furnishing or offering or
promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising
to accept" a "valuable consideration" in compromising or
attempting to compromise a disputed claim, and evidence of
statements made in such "compromise" negotiations, if the
evidence is offered to prove liability or invalidity of the claim
or its amount.

See, Utah R. Evid. 408. The policy underlying

the rule is grounded in the recognition that willingness to
compromise a claim for less than all that is due might be
construed as an admission of weakness, and settlement overtures
might be adversely affected if compromise efforts that failed
were subsequently admissible at any trial.

See, J. Moore,

Moore!s Federal Practice § 408.02 (1989 and Supp. 1990).3

3

The text of Utah R. Evid. 408 follows the federal rule,
verbatim. Thus in the absence of Utah case law counsel has cited
authorities interpreting the identical federal rule.
-12-

This Court should note, however, that the language of the
rule is specific and expressly defines the limits of the
exclusion.

In order for the exclusionary rule to apply, the

party seeking to have evidence excluded must show that the
discussion or statements in question were made in "compromise"
negotiations.

:id. at § 408.03. An offer or willingness to

compromise, which in turn could be construed as an admission, is
the sine qua non of any communication protected both by the rule
and the policy underlying the rule.

Id.

The letter at issue in the instant case, however, makes no
offer and exhibits no willingness whatsoever to compromise
Davidson1s claim, either for "valuable consideration" or
otherwise.

It simply demands payment in full of Davidson's claim

and its whole tenor is that Davidson will not compromise one
iota.

Thus the letter and the statements contained therein are

not inadmissible under rule 408, nor would admission of such
statements have any chilling effect on "compromise" negotiations.
See e.g., Gallagher v. Vikings Supply Corp., 411 P.2d 814 (Ariz.
App. 1966) ("We agree that a statement which is in the nature of
a settlement proposal or offer should be excluded.

However, a

letter which demands an amount for an alleged claim cannot be
excluded under this theory.

. . . [The letter] in no wise

purports to concede a fact solely for purposes of settlement.
Its tenor is unequivocal and precise.").

See also, Factor v.

C.I.R., 281 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960) ("Despite the use of the
-13-

term fsettlement meetings1 by counsel in the case, there is
nothing in the record to indicate that, at any time during these
conferences, the taxpayer made an offer to pay any amount,
conditioned upon a denial of liability, which is essential to a
true offer of compromise.

Nor does the record of the

conferences, as testified to in court, disclose any 'compromise1
items considered by the taxpayer.ff) .
Perhaps more importantly, even if the letter did contain
some offer to compromise, which it does not, Prince's counsel did
not offer the ten-foot statement "to establish liability or
invalidity of a claim or its amount" as prohibited by rule 408.
In United States Aviation Underwriters, inc. v. Olympia Wings,
Inc., 896 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990), the court held that the trial
court properly acted within in its discretion under rule 408 when
it admitted evidence of a settlement that was offered to impeach
the plaintiff's earlier deposition testimony.

The court stated

as follows:
We are persuaded that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting evidence of settlement to
show the change in [plaintiff's] position since his
deposition was taken. Fed. R. Evid. 408 permits
settlement evidence for any purpose except to prove or
disprove liability or the amount of claim. The
district court has broad discretion in determining
whether to admit evidence of settlement for another
purpose and we will not disturb that decision lightly.
896 F.2d at 956.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated, .in dicta, that this
same exception obtains under rule 408 of the Utah Rules of
-14

Evidence.

In Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989) the

court stated as follows:
Taken together, the two statutes [superseded
sections 78-27-29, -30, Utah Code Ann.] resulted in a
rule not unlike Utah Rule of Evidence 408, now in
effect. In other words, they precluded introduction of
the settlement for purpose of establishing liability,
but not for purposes relating to credibility.
777 P.2d at 443.

See also, Id. at n. 12 ("If, as therefore

appears likely, Rule 408 applied to the trial in this case, it
even more clearly supports the conclusion we reach [that
"settlement and payment might nonetheless come in other than as
evidence, such as for impeachment purposes"].").
In this case, Davidson had testified as to a number of
different relevant distances.

Prince's counsel offered the ten-

foot statement contained in the demand letter to refresh
Davidson's recollection as to the actual distance, and/or to
impeach Davidson's testimony on that point.

The trial court

allowed the ten-foot statement into evidence solely for that
purpose.

Under the circumstances, and according to the

principles cited above, the evidence was in no way barred by rule
408.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Prince respectfully submits
that the trial court committed no errors which would require this
Court to overturn the jury's verdict and remand for a new trial.

-15-

Thus the jury's verdict should be upheld and Davidson's appeal
denied.
DATED this 16th day of January, 1991.
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Robert C. Keller
Attorneys for Appellees
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